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Note
Section 27A of the SEA. An Unplugged Lampf Sheds
No Constitutional Light
Patrick T. Murphy
"What greater pleasure than to cheat the cheater!"1
Jean de La Fontaine
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule
10b-5, issued pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act ("SEA"),2 fails to provide a cause of action for private
litigants to remedy fraud in securities transactions, the judici-
ary has long since implied one.3 For years, however, no uniform
federal statute of limitation existed for implied securities fraud
1. "[C]'est double plaisir de tromper le trompeur." JEAN DE LA FoNTAmE,
LE CoQ Er LE RENARD, reprinted and translated in FiTY FABLEs OF LA FON-
TAmE 26-27 (Norman R. Shapiro trans., 1988).
2. As section 10 of the SEA provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary." Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1988)).
The Act contains no detailed securities regulations because Congress be-
lieved an independent Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") could bet-
ter handle such detail. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEw DEAL's SEC: THE
FoRm=rTE YEARs 57-58 (1964). The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 in response
to the Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary ... or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
3. The judiciary first recognized an implied private cause of action for
lob-5 claims in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946), cited in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S.
Ct. 2773, 2784 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) (recognizing private right); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (same); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972) (same); see also Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
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claims4 and different jurisdictions applied any limitation period
they deemed appropriate.5 The Supreme Court ended this cir-
cuit conflict 6 in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson7 and established a uniform limitation period by anal-
ogizing the appropriate limitation period to those explicitly rec-
ognized in other parts of the SEA.8 This uniform limitation
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (detailing the history of lob-5 private
right of action).
4. Because the cause of action for § 10(b) cases is judicially implied, it is
not surprising that Congress neglected to incorporate a statute of limitations
into the Act.
5. Prior to Lampf, 111 S. Ct. 2773, some jurisdictions borrowed parallel
state law fraud or blue sky statutes of limitations. See id. at 2778; Thomas H.
Stewart, Case Note, One Statute, One Statute of Limitations; At Last Uniform-
ity for Section 10(b) Claims, 60 U. CIN. L. Rav. 533, 557 & n.197, 559 & nn.207-
09 (1991). This practice caused plaintiffs to forum shop for jurisdictions where
the law would most likely deem their claims timely. Stewart, supra, at 560; see
also Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims:
A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. CoLO. L. REv. 235, 275 (1989) (discussing
forum shopping). The Supreme Court itself has a history of" 'borrow[ing]' what
it considered to be the most analogous state statute of limitations to bar tardily
commenced proceedings" in other situations where Congress provided no limi-
tation period. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,
488 (1980). This inconsistency in the application of limitation periods and the
resultant forum shopping came to a halt with Lampfs mandate of universality.
For a discussion of the anticipated results of the Lampf decision prior to enact-
ment of § 27A, see Stewart, supra.
6. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 557 n.97, 561-62.
7. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991). The question of whether Lampf itself should
apply retroactively is primarily an issue of equitable concern and a matter of
debate within the legal community. Justice O'Connor addressed this issue in
her Lampf and James Beam dissenting opinions. See James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2452 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that the Court "hinders the cause of fairness" in determining retroactive
application of rule); Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Quite
simply, the Court shuts the courthouse door on respondents because they were
unable to predict the future."). This Note does not address the soundness of
retroactively applied judicial principles, particularly those of Lampf, but fo-
cuses instead on the specific concerns relating to the retroactive effect of § 27A.
It is ironic to note, however, that those who decried the fact that the Lampf and
James Beam decisions resulted in the retroactive dismissal of their cases most
likely have little problem with § 27A retroactively reinstating them, whereas
most of those who disparage the amendment probably welcomed the retroactive
application of Lampf because it relieved them of the threat of potential liability.
8. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780-81. The Court relied in particular on § 9(e) of
the SEA, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988), and § 18(c) of the SEA, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1988), which also provided for a one year/three year frame-
work. Id. at 2780-81 & n.6. This reliance occurred partially because those pro-
visions shared the same goals of§ 10(b): protection of investors from fraud and
price manipulation. Id. at 2781. See generally Bloomenthal, supra note 5, at
246-72 (discussing the use of parallel federal provisions in determining proper
limitation periods).
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period is one year from the time the plaintiff discovers the fraud
giving rise to the claim, and three years from the fraudulent
event itself.9 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,'° decided
on the same day as Lampf, dictated that the new one year/three
year limitation period would apply retroactively to other pend-
ing securities fraud actions."
This retroactive application of the new limitation period re-
sulted in the dismissal of many pending cases 12 and prompted
Congress to pass remedial legislation to alleviate the perceived
injustice to plaintiffs who faced dismissal of their claims.' 3 On
December 19, 1991, Congress enacted section 476 of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
("FDICIA"), which was incorporated as section 27A14 of the SEA
9. Lampf, III S. Ct. at 2780-81.
10. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
11. Id. at 2441. James Beam involved the question of whether judicial de-
cisions should apply prospectively, retroactively, or through selected retroactiv-
ity based on a balance of equities in each particular case. Five members of the
court wrote separate opinions with none commanding a majority vote. Compare
id. at 2450 (Blackmnun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("We fulfill our judicial
responsibility by requiring retroactive application of each new rule we an-
nounce.") with id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Nothing...
is meant to suggest that I retreat from those opinions ... recognizing that in
proper cases a new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroac-
tively .... ).
Although the James Beam decision fails to clarify the rationale behind ret-
roactive application ofjudicial decisions, the decision resulted in retroactive ap-
plication of the limitation principle announced in Lampf. Id. at 2441. This
retroactive application resulted in the potential discharge of all the pending
securities fraud cases that failed to meet the limitation period set by Lampf.
See Anthony Michael Sabino, A Statutory Beacon or a Relighted Lampf? The
Constitutional Crisis of the New Limitary Period for Federal Securities Law Ac-
tions, 28 TuLSA L.J. 23, 61-65 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court itself
may not continue to believe in the wisdom of retroactive application of Lampt).
12. Some of the cases that were dismissed involved such high profile de-
fendants as Michael Milken and Charles Keating. See 137 CONG. REc. S17,725
(daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991), S17356 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991); see also 137 CONG.
REC. H11S1 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Congressman Dingell) (dis-
cussing the monetary value of claims dismissed and pending dismissal).
13. See generally In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1104-06
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing the legislative history that the court used to find
§ 27A unconstitutional).
14. Pub. L. No. 102-242, ch. 476, § 27A, 105 Stat. 2236, 2387 (1991) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (Supp. 1I 1991)).
The full text of the amendment is as follows:
(a) Effect on Pending Causes of Action. The limitation period for any
private civil action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was
commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles
of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
99
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of 1934.15 Section 27A displaces the James Beam inspired
retroactive application of a limitation period for implied securi-
ties fraud claims articulated by the Supreme Court in Lampf.
Part (a) of section 27A provides that all claims brought
before the Lampf decision that are still pending final determina-
tion shall be decided under pre-Lampf law, thus denying Lampf
any further retroactive application. 16 Part (b) of the amendment
allows plaintiffs to reinstate claims that had been dismissed
pursuant to Lampf.17 The passage of section 27A resulted in an
explosion of litigation as plaintiffs rushed to resurrect claims
that were either dismissed or faced dismissal under Lampf.18
This Note argues that section 27A(b) oversteps the bounda-
ries of our governmental framework through the legislative dis-
possession of judicially vested rights. This Note also suggests
that although section 27A(a) is likely to be deemed constitu-
tional in light of recent precedent, it too strains the relationship
between the legislature and the judiciary. Part I of this Note
focuses on the theory underlying retroactive legislation, particu-
larly its effect on vested rights and statutes of limitation. Part I
also details how such legislation fits within the Constitution's
dual requirements of due process of law and separation of pow-
ers. Part II discusses the decisions that have ruled on the con-
stitutionality of both subsections of 27A, concentrating on the
various rationales for sustaining or striking down the amend-
(b) Effect on Dismissed Causes of Action. Any civil private action im-
plied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before
June 19, 1991
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19,
1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitations pe-
riod provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including prin-
ciples of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be
reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after the
date of enactment of this section.
Id.
15. The SEA established the SEC to oversee transactions involving pub-
licly traded institutions and to curb the effects of corrupt corporate inside trad-
ing. For a general discussion of some of the SEC's functions and how stock
market regulation was the primary impetus behind the 1934 SEA, see DE
BEDTS, supra note 2, at 76-85 and JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET 99-100 (1982).
16. See supra note 14 (language of § 27A(a)).
17. See supra note 14 (language of § 27A(b)). Section 27A does not affect
the prospective application of the Lampf limitation period.
18. For a partial list of cases filed in the immediate wake of § 27A and their
holdings, see Fry v. UAL Corp., No. 90 C 0999, 1992 WL 177086, at *12 (N.D.
IlM. July 23, 1992).
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ment on constitutional grounds. Part III analyzes the applicable
constitutional provisions and demonstrates that although recent
precedent may protect subsection 27A(a), subsection (b) violates
both due process and separation of powers by depriving litigants
of rights vested through the final judgment of a court.
I. RETROACTIVITY, LIMITATION PERIODS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. DuE PROCESS CONCERNS AND RETROACTIVITY: JUDIcIAL
ACQUIESCENCE DESPITE A NEGATIVE PRESUMPTION
Although the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution pro-
hibits retroactive legislation,' 9 the courts have only applied this
constitutional prohibition to criminal laws, thereby insulating
retroactive civil legislation somewhat. 20 Thus, "the mere fact
that a statute is retroactive in its operation does not make it
repugnant to the Federal Constitution." 21 Despite the lack of an
express constitutional bar,22 courts have historically evinced a
distaste for retroactive civil legislation,23 and such laws face a
general negative presumption24 under the "vested rights"
doctrine.25
19. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
20. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
21. League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 161 (1902). The Constitution does, how-
ever, prohibit state impairment of contractual obligation. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10.
22. Several states have constitutional bars against retroactive legislation.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 11, & art. XV, § 12; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 1 10;
Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
23. See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAnv. L. Rnv. 692, 693 (1960) (arguing Supreme
Court opinions evidence "hostility to retroactive legislation").
24. See Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 2035, 2036 (1992).
25. See EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINsT GovERNmENT 72-75
(1948). Under a substantive rubric, the government not only refrains from in-
fringing upon individual rights, but also exists to ensure their protection. See
Arthur L. Harding, Freedom to Use Property, in FREE MAN VERsus HIs GovWRN-
MENT 79, 90-91 (Arthur L. Harding ed., 1958). See infra part I.B.2 for further
discussion of vested rights.
This distaste for retroactive legislation stems from the Fifth Amendment's
incorporation of a concern for stability and the common-law tradition that while
a court's ruling may implicate past actions, the legislature should only legislate
prospectively. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 692-93. The concern that Con-
gress should legislate prospectively arises partially from the courts' belief that a
legislative body should provide guidance for future conduct, rather than react to
past events, out of respect for the concept of natural justice. See Elmer E.
Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Juris-
202 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:197
Despite judicial disfavor of retroactive legislation, Congress
has passed many retroactive statutes which have survived con-
stitutional scrutiny.26 The Supreme Court has not announced
any specific due process balancing test for determining the con-
stitutionality of retroactive legislation,27 and no uniform ap-
proach is discernable from cases addressing the issue.28
The functional validity of the level of infringement on due
process interests by retroactive legislation varies according to
the underlying characteristics of the interests at stake.29 For
example, the judiciary has more readily acceded to retroactive
legislation if Congress enacted it in response to unforeseen and
compelling circumstances, 30 and when Congress plainly evi-
dences an intent to prescribe a new statute retroactively.31 The
prudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 789-90 (1936) (explaining that retroactive laws
may violate "first principles, reason, justice, or the nature of our government.");
see also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("The
principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions oper-
ate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student."). Concern over the sub-
stance of such legislation is based in the concept of unassailable natural rights.
See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 351 (4th ed.
1991). See generally RIcHARD ASHcRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY PoLumcs & LocKE's
Two Treatises of Government 255-57 (1986) (comparing a subsistence level of
the natural right to property with the rights contemplated in a more highly
developed society).
26. See WILLiAm N. ESKRmGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICIEY, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 275
(1988).
27. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,727-
28 & n.6 (1984) (explicitly rejecting functional test expounded by the Seventh
Circuit).
28. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 407-08 ("ETihe legislative his-
tory of the due process clauses fails to provide the Court with any special crite-
ria to determine when retroactive legislation violates constitutional
principles.").
This inconsistency may be due in part to the historically shifting views re-
garding the proper level of protection from legislative interference in individual
property rights provided by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 379 (discussing
cyclical nature of due process jurisprudence).
29. Compare Hochman, supra note 23, at 696-97 (proposing a three factor
analysis including the public interest, nature of the right, and degree of in-
fringement) with NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 407-15 (lumping retro-
active statutes into four major categories).
30. Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447
(1934) (upholding depression era legislation designed to aid troubled mortga-
gors against an impairment of contracts claim) with Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (holding legislation destroying
value of mortgage unconstitutional). See generally Hochman, supra note 23, at
697-711 (arguing that the stronger the public interest served by a retroactive
statute, the more likely it will be upheld).
31. See Estrin, supra note 24, at 2047-48; see also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
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Supreme Court has held that although retroactive legislation
generally must only have a rational basis,3 2 the judiciary may
heighten its review when such legislation infringes on individ-
ual rights.3 3 In assessing the validity of retroactive legislation,
however, courts do engage in a subtle balancing of individual
and governmental interests3 4 with the scale skewed in the gov-
ernment's favor. Under this variation of the rational basis test,
the judiciary still applies only a "low level of scrutiny" to such
general retroactive laws3 5 because the "burden is met simply by
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is it-
self justified by a rational legislative purpose."3 6
B. THE EFFECT OF RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION ON JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING
1. Statutory Bars, Rights, and Remedies
Numerous commentators 37 and courts38 have addressed the
effect of statutes of limitation on individual rights. Despite the
panorama of discourse, no conclusive schematic framework for
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,16 (1976), quoted in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984) ("[Olur cases are clear that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets other-
wise settled expectations [citations omitted]. This is true even though the effect
of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts.").
32. R. A Gray, 467 U.S. at 730; Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18-19.
33. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 17 ("The retroactive aspects of legislation,
as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the
justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former."); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (listing cases dealing with
infringement on a wide range of rights).
34. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 697.
35. See Estrin, supra note 24, at 2048.
36. RA Gray, 467 U.S. at 730 (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., Hochman, supra note 23, at 720-24 (arguing that rights
granted by statutes of limitations rely on insubstantial equity); Thomas G. Bur-
roughs, Note, Retroactive Application of Legislatively Enlarged Statute of Limi-
tations for Child Abuse: Time's No Bar to Revival, 22 IND. L. Rv. 989, 1016
(1989) (discussing statutes of limitations and revived claims in the criminal
context).
38. See, e.g., Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 487 (1980) ("[Tlhere comes a point at which the delay... in asserting a
claim is sufficiently likely... to upset settled expectations that a substantive
claim will be barred.... ."); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945) (explaining that statute of limitation protection "has never been re-
garded as what now is called a 'fundamental' right" and is "good only by legisla-
tive grace and ... subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.").
But cf Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487 ("Statutes of limitations are not simply techni-
calities. On the contrary they have long been respected as fundamental to a
well-ordered judicial system.").
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determining the proper effect of a limitation period on any given
right has evolved.39 This inconsistency results in part from the
arbitrary, pragmatic basis for the application of statutes of limi-
tation.40 The Supreme Court has often affirmed the importance
of such artificial limitation periods,41 but allows their circum-
vention with little difficulty when it deems the situation
appropriate. 42
Due to concerns about the artificiality of statutes of limita-
tion and fairness to the reasonable expectations of litigants,
courts generally do not enforce rights acquired through or extin-
guished by the expiration of a statute of limitation when the leg-
islature enacts subsequent legislation to eliminate those
rights.43 In Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,44 for example,
the Supreme Court allowed such a legislatively altered limita-
tion period to stand.45
The Chase Securities decision underscores the distinction
between fully extinguished rights, and remedies lost through
the "mere lapse of time." 46 The Court stated that the legisla-
ture may alter a limitation period "even after a right of action is
39. The Supreme Court has stated that "[s]tatutes of limitations always
have vexed the philosophical mind for it is difficult to fit them into a completely
logical and symmetrical system of law." Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 313.
40. See id. at 314 ("[Limitation periods] find their justification in necessity
and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles .... They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and una-
voidable delay.").
41. See Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487.
42. See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 316. The Court found no per se con-
stitutional offense in circumventing a statute of limitation. The Court also
highlighted a lack of hardship associated with lifting a limitary bar and a lack
of any justifiable reliance on former law by the defendants. Id.
43. See, e.g., id. at 316 ("The nature of the defenses shows that no course of
action was undertaken... on the assumption that the old rule would be contin-
ued." One cannot commit a wrong and "depend[ ] on a statute of limitation for
shelter from liability."); International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976) (holding that legislative revival
of a time barred action did not violate due process).
44. 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
45. Without enumerating a specific test to apply to legislative alterations
of limitation periods, the Court observed the following:
[s]ome are of the opinion that... limitations statutes should be viewed
as extinguishing the claim and destroying the right itself.... On the
other hand, some common-law courts have regarded true statutes of
limitations as doing no more than to cut off resort to the courts for
enforcement of a claim.
Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
46. See id. at 316. But see Hochman, supra note 23, at 711-12 n.106
(describing "right-remedy dichotomy" as conclusory and "of little use in decid-
[Vol. 78:197204
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barred thereby, restore to the plaintiff his remedy, and divest
the defendant of the statutory bar."47 The Court indicated, how-
ever, that it would allow this result because the contested legis-
lative action occurred "before final adjudication." 48
Because statutes of limitations are generally legislatively
created 49 and appear to affect only the remedies through which
one attempts to assert rights rather than the underlying rights
themselves,50 it is problematic to use the term "vested rights"
when discussing these statutes.5 ' Distinguishing between
rights and remedies is important because under current doc-
trine Congress has the power to alter or modify the remedies for
asserting a vested right but cannot tamper with the underlying
right itself.52
2. Possible Circumvention of the Adjudicatory Process
Traditionally, courts have held that retroactive legislation
may not unsettle "vested" rights.53 There is no general consen-
sus about exactly how rights vest, however.54 With the decline
ing a particular case"); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 413 (describing
right/remedy distinction as "hazy").
47. Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 311-12.
48. 325 U.S. at 316. The language of Chase Securities indicates that this
"final adjudication" distinction simply requires a final termination of the litiga-
tion and does not require an actual determination of the substantive merits of
the claim. See id. at 310 (stating that this case was not one in which "statutory
immunity from suit had been fully adjudged so that legislative action deprived
[defendant] of a final judgment in its favor").
Moreover, unless otherwise specified, judgments based on statutes of limi-
tation are considered to be "on the merits." See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Shoup v.
Boll & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1180 (4th Cir. 1989); Nilson v. City of Moss
Point, 674 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1982), on rehearing, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.
1983) (en bane); Nathan v. Rowan, 651 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981).
49. Compare Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (stating that statutes of
limitations are born through the legislative, rather than the judicial process)
with Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2780 (1991) (recognizing ajudicially implied statute of limitation for an implied
cause of action).
50. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628 (1885) ("[N]o right is destroyed
when the law restores a remedy which has been lost.").
51. For a general discussion of the difficult distinction between rights and
remedies, see Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tx. L. REv.
231, 241-48 (1927); Hochman, supra note 23, at 711-12 n.106 and accompanying
text; NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 413-15.
52. See Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922) (stating that "so long as a
substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided due process of law is
not denied by a legislative change").
53. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 696.
54. Hochman argues that three factors must be considered in determining
the validity of a right in light of retroactive legislation: the "public interest
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of substantive due process, 55 the "vesting" controversy now re-
volves around whether a final judgment is sufficient to vest
rights,56 or whether, as several commentators suggest, the "in-
definite language of the due process clause" 5 7 may require an
additional element of justifiable reliance in the finality of the
judgment to render adjudicated rights inviolable. 58 Whatever
the specifics of the test applied, the analytical focus consistently
centers on notions of fairness to the litigants before the court.5 9
This principle of fairness to the respective parties, however, is
necessarily viewed in the context of the structural guarantees of
our system of governance. 60
Notwithstanding the general uncertainty about the exact
served by the statute", the nature of the asserted right, and the degree of in-
fringement the statute imposes on that right. Hochman, supra note 23, at 697.
But see Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6 TEx. L. Rxv.
409 (1928) ("[T]he distinctions between vested and non-vested rights... were
found to break down before the hard cases and to serve mainly to label or class-
ify the decisions after they have already been reached on other grounds."); cf
Edward S. Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitu-
tional Law, 38 MICH. L. REv. 30, 56 (1939) (concluding that statutes invalidated
by the Due Process Clause should be limited to those "where a party has
changed his position in reliance on existing law").
Indeed, the Supreme Court has had difficulty defining the term because
"the word [sic] vested right is nowhere used in the Constitution." Campbell,
115 U.S. at 628. The Court went on to say that "although vested rights may
exist, they are better described by some more exact term, as the phrase itself is
not one found in the language of the Constitution." Id.
55. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing changing his-
torical views of the concepts of due process and natural justice).
56. See Hodges v. Synder, 261 U.S. 600 (1923). "[T]he private rights of
parties which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken
away by subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by the court
regardless of such legislation." Id. at 603. The Court explained that this rule
did not hold true for public rights. Id. Rule 10b-5 claims, however, involve a
private cause of action to enforce private rights. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2779; see
also Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 875 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1976) (distinguishing between Hodges and McCullough v. Virginia, and
questioning continued validity of that distinction), overruled on other grounds,
Brown v. Marquette Say. & Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 1982). See
generally Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70
(1982) (distinguishing public from private rights while admitting that the dis-
tinction is not always clear).
57. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 694.
58. See Smith, supra note 54, at 409; Stimson, supra note 54, at 56.
59. See Smith, supra note 54, at 409; Stimson, supra note 54, at 56. The
tripartite analysis of Hochman, supra note 23, at 697, can also be collapsed into
this basic principle relatively easily, with each of his factors sliding the balance
on the scale of equity.
60. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (two-fold nature of adjudi-
cated rights).
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nature of vested rights, the Supreme Court in McCullough v.
Virginia6l held that legislation cannot specifically overturn final
judgments of the courts.62 The McCullough Court reaffirmed
and gave specific voice to the long acknowledged constitutional
principle that a legislature may not "change the rights and lia-
bilities of parties, which have been established by a solemn judg-
ment."63 This formulation of the "vested rights" 64 doctrine
requires a two-fold constitutional analysis.65 Adjudicated rights
are essentially a form of private property,66 which implicates
due process interests.6 7 In addition, vested rights analysis in-
corporates a separation of powers component as the judicial de-
termination of litigants' rights68 is protected from a superior
legislative review.6 9 Thus, allowing Congress to divest specifi-
cally adjudicated rights threatens to violate the dual constitu-
tional requirements of due process and an independent
judiciary.70
61. 172 U.S. 102 (1898).
62. Id. "It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights
which have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent
proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed
into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby
ceases." Id. at 123-24. As the Court went on to state in this particular context:
"[W]e have no doubt that the rights acquired by the judgment... were not
disturbed by a subsequent repeal of the statute." Id. at 124; see Hodges v. Sny-
der, 261 U.S. 600, 603 (1923); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641,
647-48 (1874); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 n.4 (1792); Georgia
Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989); Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La
Plata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 760, 768 (1849).
64. See CoRWIn, supra note 25, at 72.
65. See id. at 72-73 (stating that initially the vested rights doctrine was
directed "at legislation interfering with judicial decisions affecting vested
rights" and later developed to encompass general legislation).
66. See Harding, supra note 25, at 82 (describing the legal recognition of a
claim as a "right of intangible property").
67. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V. ("No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.... ."); see also Georgia Ass'n of
Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing
property aspect of adjudicated rights which legislature has "no greater power
(over] than any other"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989). This property aspect
invokes both the procedural aspect of due process and the relatively low level of
substantive due process, which may be heightened when specific individual
rights are involved. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177-78 (1803) (asserting that denying the necessity of judicial interpreta-
tion of constitutionally supreme legal principles "would subvert the very foun-
dations of all written constitutions").
69. See Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens, 855 F.2d at 810.
70. See Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811,816 (D.C.
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Congress does have the ability, however, to directly circum-
vent the constraints of the "vested rights" doctrine in two ways.
Congress may waive the res judicata effect of a prior judgment
in its favor.71 Such a waiver is consistent with the congressional
capacity "to pay the Debts... of the United States," 72 which
would be overridden were res judicata binding on the govern-
ment. Additionally, Congress may overturn the results of spe-
cific cases to the extent that they affect "public right[s] over
which Congress has unfettered control,"73 but may not infringe
on private rights settled by the courts. 74
Despite the limits on direct congressional infringement of
adjudicated rights, those rights are not entirely inviolate be-
cause the final judgment of a lower court may be overturned as
erroneous on appeal. 75 Moreover, while a case is on appeal,
courts will apply laws enacted after the lower court decision that
change the underlying law. This application of the new law may
affect the final disposition of the case76 because a reviewing
court must "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its de-
cision." 77 Because such laws do not undermine final judicial de-
terminations, they neither infringe on the independence of the
judiciary, nor divest litigants of settled rights.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides another man-
ner for possible "Relief from Judgment or Order," whereby
courts may, in unusual circumstances, grant relief from an
otherwise final judgment to promote equity.78 Aside from unu-
Cir. 1974). The Daylo court stated that such behavior would "subject all judi-
cial action to superior legislative review, a regime obviously inconsistent with
due process of law and subversive of the constitutional independence of the ju-
dicial branch of government." Id.; see also Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054,
1059-60 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (discussing "twofold nature of this 'vested rights'
doctrine" involving due process and separation of powers).
71. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 397 (1980).
72. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
73. Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens, 855 F.2d at 812.
74. See id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421, 431 (1855)); see also Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04
(1923) (distinguishing between public and private rights).
75. See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HAv. L.
REV. 351, 353-67 (1961) (discussing considerations and theory behind appeals of
final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
76. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108-10
(1801).
77. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
78. FED. R. Cwr. P. 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
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sual factual circumstances, a change in the law may also "avoid
the resjudicata effect of a prior judgment by creating new rights
or remedies." 79 Such a change may open the door for a court to
revisit a seemingly final judgment in the interest of equitable
justice80 under Rule 60(b),81 but "[nlormally, a final judgment is
not open even to direct attack... solely on the basis of a subse-
quent change in circumstances."8 2 Although Congress may cre-
ate the necessary change in circumstances, the judiciary must
determine if that change is sufficient to revisit a final judg-
ment.8 3 Congress itself cannot divest adjudicated rights except
in the two narrow ways discussed above.8 4
3. An Independent Judiciary and the Competitive Nature of
an Active Congress
a. Overriding Separation of Powers Principles
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the legislative
power 85 and enumerates many of the instances in which that
power may be exercised. 6 Because the Constitution contem-
plates Congress as the main policy-making body,8 7 legislative
reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated... or, (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
79. 1B JAmEs W. MooRE sT AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.415, at 302
(2d ed. 1993). Authority supports finding a change in a controlling statute as
sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b). See Sys-
tem Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 648-51 (1961).
80. One needs "exceptional and compelling circumstances for Rule 60(b)
relief." 7 MooRE T AL., supra note 79, 60.27[1]. The Rule "is intended to be a
means for accomplishingjustice ... and, so confined, does not violate the princi-
ple of finality ofjudgments. Id. T 60.27[2], at 274; see also Sutherland v. Fitz-
gerald, 291 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1961) (explaining that a motion for relief
from judgment does not affect the finality of that judgment).
81. Granting a Rule 60(b) motion for relief is "within the discretion of the
court rendering judgment." 21 FED. Paoc., L.ED. § 51:116 (1984).
82. 1B MooRE ET AL., supra note 79, 0.415, at 305. To grant relief under
Rule 60(b), the court must conclude that the circumstantial change implicates a
new right or that substantial inequity would result from a denial of relief. See 7
MooRE ET AL., supra note 79, 60.27[1].
83. See Tonya K. ex rel Diane K. v. Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 1248
(7th Cir. 1988) (stating in dictum that arguing Rule 60(b) "does not interfere
with vested rights" would defeat the concept of "rights" entirely).
84. See Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 811
(11th Cir. 1988).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 25,
at 123-24 (listing other sources of congressional authority).
87. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) ("The essentials
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enactments are presumed valid8 8 unless they infringe on ex-
plicit provisions of the Constitution.8 9
Although Congress exercises an active role in our govern-
mental structure,90 the judiciary is much more passive. 9 1 The
theory of binding precedent 92 and Article uIrs "case or contro-
versy" requirement 93 combine to limit judicial power. This lat-
ter limitation on the judiciary forbids the courts from giving
Congress advisory opinions on the validity of a particular law
because such advisory opinions subvert the "judicial . . . na-
ture" 94 of the courts' constitutional role.
Although the judiciary and Congress have seemingly dis-
tinct roles, they need not "operate with absolute indepen-
dence" 95 because they have "overlapping responsibility" 96 in the
proper functioning of the government. It is imperative, however,
that "no provision of law 'impermissibly threaten the institu-
tional integrity of the Judicial Branch.'"97 Essentially, Con-
gress may not undermine the independence and integrity of the
judiciary through legislative encroachment 98 because an effec-
of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct .. ").
88. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (ex-
plaining presumption of constitutionality); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932) (stating desire to construe legislative action as constitutional whenever
possible).
89. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also United States v.
Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908) (stating that Congress must show "due re-
gard to all the provisions of the Constitution").
90. Unlike the courts, Congress is not limited by a precedent setting juris-
prudential theory. Rather, the political and legislative processes limit congres-
sional behavior. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism,
74 VA. L. REv. 519, 554 (1988). This, of course, leaves the legislature more
prone to the influence of "short-term passions" than an independent court sys-
tem. Id. at 556.
91. See generally id. at 551-58 (outlining distinction between courts and
legislatures).
92. See id. at 554.
93. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,361 (1911) (declaring that
the judiciary's power arises "because the rights of the litigants ... require the
court to choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to be...
constitutional").
94. Id. at 362.
95. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
96. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
97. Id. at 383 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
98. Mistretta adopted a "flexible understanding of separation of powers,"
but reaffirmed the Court's willingness "to strike down provisions of law... that
undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate
Branch." Id. at 381-82; see THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (James Madison)
210 [Vol. 78:197
1993] LIMITATION PERIOD RETROACTIVITY 211
rive separation of powers is "essential to the preservation of lib-
erty."99 Moreover, Congress may not deny litigants the
opportunity to fairly challenge legislation that infringes on due
process rights.100 Congress's limited Article III capacity 01 con-
fers no judicial power on the Congress because "[tihe judicial
Power of the United States [is] vested in [the] [S]upreme Court"
and lower courts.' 0 2
b. Rule of Decision Analysis
The "rule of decision" doctrine represents a particular appli-
cation of the exclusivity of the judicial power. Although Con-
gress may change the underlying law while cases are on
appeal, 0 3 it may not provide a "rule of decision" that directs
particular findings or outcomes for the courts to follow in adjudi-
cating cases. The Supreme Court first announced this principle
in the reconstruction era case United States v. Klein.'0 4 In
Klein, the Court held that Congress could not command courts
to ignore evidence of a presidential pardon in determining
whether claimants who had to prove their loyalty to the United
States in order to recover property seized as a result of the Civil
War were actually loyal.' 0 5 The Klein Court acknowledged con-
(J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.").
99. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380.
100. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (as-
suming "that a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in
judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute
depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis").
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting Congress authority to "ordain
and establish" lower courts); id. art. IH, § 2 (granting Congress authority to
alter the Supreme Court's jurisdiction).
102. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
103. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
104. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). The Constitution empowers Congress to
change the underlying law when it disagrees with the results of judicial inter-
pretation. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Problems arise, how-
ever, when Congress attempts to control the outcome of a case or category of
cases without amending the underlying law that gives rise to the claim. At
least one court has found this consideration compelling in striking down § 27A
as unconstitutional. See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105
(N.D. Cal. 1992). But see Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 476, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting "considerable dispute... as to how
broadly KMein is to be read").
105. The plaintiff administrator in Klein sought reimbursement from the
government for the proceeds from a sale of property during the Civil War. The
government granted such proceeds upon a proper showing of loyalty. Mlein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139. The property owner had received a presidential pardon,
which the courts previously had adjudged to be conclusive proof of loyalty. See
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
gressional ability to control the jurisdiction of the lower courts
but was also concerned with the "great and controlling purpose"
of the contested legislation.' 0 6 The Court considered the con-
gressional attempt to deny the judicially determined effect of a
pardon to be an untenable legislative encroachment, as Con-
gress tried to forbid the court from giving "the effect to evidence
which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have." 10 7
The Supreme Court recently revisited the rule of decision
theory in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.'08 In Seattle
Audubon, the Court assessed a section of the Northwest Timber
Compromise,' 0 9 which altered timber harvesting rights in for-
ests inhabited by spotted owls. These harvesting rights were
the subject of ongoing litigation, and the legislation specified
that certain pending cases met the statutory criteria for bring-
ing a claim."10 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
the law as violative of Klein because it directed a particular deci-
sion in a case without repealing or amending the underlying
law.' The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this disposi-
tion, stating that because Congress changed the underlying law
and did not "direct any particular findings of fact or applications
of law, old or new, to fact," Klein did not apply at all. 21
II. SECTION 27A AND JUDICIAL REACTION
Prior to Lampf, the circuit courts did not apply a uniform
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870). Congress en-
acted subsequent legislation stating that a pardon was inadmissible proof of
loyalty, but the Court held that the statute directed a rule of decision in contra-
vention of separation of powers without changing the underlying law. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 143-48.
106. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
107. Id. at 147.
108. 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (1992).
109. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1990, § 318, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 745 (1989).
110. Congress set forth these requirements in subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Act:
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas ...
known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for
the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis
for the consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v.
F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers
Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting pre-
liminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v.
Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR.
Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 747 (1989).
111. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
112. Seattle Audubon, 112 S. Ct. at 1413.
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limitation period for 10b-5 securities fraud claims.1 13 Commen-
tators applauded the uniformity created by Lampf" 4 but criti-
cized its retroactive application.11 5  Congress eventually
responded to this criticism by adopting section 27A to deny
Lampf its retroactivity. 116 A spate of litigation regarding the
constitutionality of section 27A soon followed.'1 7 Defendants
have attacked the amendment on constitutional grounds, argu-
ing that section 27A violates the separation of powers by man-
dating a rule of decision,-1 8 and that it violates due process by
resuscitating settled claims and removing vested rights.119
Although federal district courts have disagreed on the constitu-
tionality of the amendment,120 the circuit courts that have as-
sessed the validity of part (a) of the amendment have
113. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 556-58 (discussing previous methods for
determining limitary periods prior to Lampf).
114. See Joseph Cachey HI, Case Comment, Lampfv. Gilbertson: Rule lOb-
5's Time Has Come, 69 DENy. U. L. Rlv. 135, 149 (1992) ("[A] uniform, national
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions is in accordance with virtually
every commentator who has written on the subject.").
115. See, e.g., id. (describing retroactivity of Lampf as "deplorable").
116. See generally In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1104-06
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (discussing legislative history of amendment and finding § 27A
unconstitutional).
117. For a partial list of cases filed in the immediate wake of § 27A and their
holdings, see Fry v. UAL Corp., No. 90 C 0999, 1992 WL 177086, at *12 (N.D.
Ill. July 23, 1992).
The potential effect of the amendment on vexatious litigation also concerns
many. "[Amny company whose stock price is volatile is a sitting duck for these
10(b) lawsuits regardless of whether there is any fraud involved." 137 CONG.
REc. S17,358 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see also
The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARv. L. REv. 177, 409
(1991) ("Lampf will... result in considerable savings of time and money for
both litigants and courts."). See generally 137 CONG. Rxc. S17,356-58 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 1991) (discussing the number of 10b-5 lawsuits and their effect on
business).
118. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (discussing rule of de-
cision analysis).
119. Although litigants often raise equal protection claims in conjunction
with due process claims, this Note does not address equal protection concerns
because to do so would not add substantially to the line of argument pursued.
120. Compare In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992)(finding § 27A unconstitutional), TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587 (E.D.
La. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republic Bank, 997
F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), and Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098(D. Colo. 1992) (same) with Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc.,
No. 89 C 8571, 1992 WL 3694 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1992) (upholding the amend-
ment), Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (same), and Fred Hindler, Inc. v. Telequest, Inc., Civ. No. 89-0847, 1992
WL 158631 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1992) (same).
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universally found it a valid exercise of legislative power.121 Nu-
merous appeals are currently pending in other circuit courts,
and a potential split could return the issue to the Supreme
Court.1
2 2
A. DECISIONS FINDING 27A CONSTITUTIONAL
1. The Circuit Courts
The Tenth Circuit, inAnixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,
was the first appellate court to address the constitutionality of
section 27A. 123 In Anixter, the circuit court reversed a favorable
judgment of $130 million for the plaintiffs124 in light of Lampf.
Plaintiffs sought reinstatement after enactment of section 27A,
and the Tenth Circuit ordered the original verdict reinstated.125
The Anixter defendants argued that section 27A was uncon-
stitutional because it impermissibly commanded courts to decide
cases in a particular manner and thus upset rights that had
vested through a final judgment. 12 6 The court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that Congress had mandated a wrongful
rule of decision in contravention of Klein.12 7 It distinguished
Klein's rule of decision analysis, concluding that section 27A
"does not remove or alter the courts' constitutional adjudicatory
function." 128 The court also relied on United States v. Sioux Na-
tion of Indians,129 stating that Congress could "waiv[e] the res
judicata defense of a prior judgment" 13° because the alteration
121. See infra part IIHA. (detailing circuit court decisions).
122. See Barbara Franklin, Last Word on 'Lampf; Circuits Weigh Chal-
lenges to Post-Decision Law, N.Y. L.J. Oct. 22, 1992, at 5.
123. 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
124. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1430 (10th Cir. 1991),
vacated sub nom. Dennler v. Trippet, 112 S. Ct. 1658 (1992) (remanding case for
consideration in light of § 27A), modified, 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) (re-
versing in part and affirming in part the decision of the trial court), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
125. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1542.
126. Id. at 1544.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1545. The court also relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992), which found that
§ 27A "did not 'direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law."
Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1545 (quoting Seattle Audubon, 112 S. Ct. at 1413).
129. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
130. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (citing Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 397). The
Tenth Circuit's reliance on Sioux Nation seems misguided. Sioux Nation
stands for the principle that Congress can waive a statutory bar to claims
against the United States. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 397. The government's
waiver of its own res judicata defense cannot be equated with a governmental
waiver of a private party's res judicata defense. Cf Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
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of a technical defense, such as a statute of limitation, does not
intrude on the judiciary's role.' 31 Finally, in disposing of de-
fendants' vested rights claim, the court relied on Congress's
power to alter statutes of limitations within the due process con-
straints of Chase Securities.13 2 In reinstating plaintiffs' claims
under section 27A(b),13 3 the Anixter court made no mention of
the rule that rights acquired through final judgments are vested
in the litigants.' 3 '
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided Anixter, the Elev-
enth Circuit also found section 27A constitutional in Henderson
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.13 5 In Henderson, investors had initi-
ated a class action suit alleging over $370 million in losses due
to securities fraud.13 6 Prior to trial, the lower court granted the
defendant corporation summary judgment in light of Lampfs
new limitation period.'37 While the plaintiffs' appeal of that dis-
missal was pending, Congress enacted section 27A. Believing
that no other appellate court had yet addressed the issue,138 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that section 27A is a "classic exam-
ple" of Congress permissibly amending a statute when it dis-
agrees with judicial interpretation. 3 9 The court stated that
"[amny effect on pending cases is solely a result of a change in the
underlying law," and ordered the lower court to reinstate the
& Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1856) (explaining that it is
permissible to modify judgments to the extent the remedy affects public rather
than private rights). But cf Hochman, supra note 23, at 723 (arguing that a
stricter standard governs when the legislature modifies rights against the gov-
ernment than when it modifies rights between individuals).
131. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546.
132. Id. at 1546. The Court decided Chase Securities under the assumption
that statutes of limitations "come into the law not through the judicial process
but through legislation." 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Lampf involved a judicially
implied limitation period to complement a judicially implied cause of action
rather than a legislatively enacted limitation period. See Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991).
133. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1547.
134. See supra notes 56 and 62 and accompanying text (discussing rights
vested through judgment).
135. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1993) (No. 92-2061).
136. Id. at 1569.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1571.
139. Id. at 1571 n.4. The dissent found that Congress impermissibly set out
specific rules of decision. Id. at 1576 (Wellford, J., dissenting). For a general
discussion of the increasing pace at which Congress has been overruling
promulgations from the Supreme Court, see Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich,
When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. Rzv. 729, 748-49 (1991).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:197
action.' 40 The court undertook a cursory analysis of the plain-
tiffs' due process argument,14 1 but because this case was pend-
ing appeal at the time Congress enacted section 27, the court did
not discuss the principle of rights vesting through final
judgment. 142
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have since followed suit,
finding the amendment constitutionally sound in Gray v. First
Winthrop Corp. 14 and Berning v. A. G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc.,144 respectively. The Gray opinion provides a more thor-
ough analysis than Berning, but the reasoning of both opinions
is similar to that of the earlier Tenth and Eleventh Circuit deci-
sions. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits expressly declared
that they were not dealing with situations in which there had
been a final judgment. As a result, they declined to rule on the
validity of the amendment on those grounds.145
2. Other Decisions Finding 27A Constitutional
District courts finding section 27A constitutional have ap-
plied various levels of scrutiny to the amendment.146 The rea-
soning of these decisions also mirrors that of the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits, finding the Klein rule of decision rationale in-
sufficient to strike down the amendment. Moreover, these
courts display little substantive discussion of the McCullough
rule of rights vesting in final judgments.147
140. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573, 1575.
141. See id. at 1573-74. The court also addressed an equal protection claim,
but found the claim equally lacking in merit. Id. at 1574.
142. See supra note 62 (discussing vested rights doctrine).
143. 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993). The Gray court expressly acknowledged
that rational basis scrutiny applied to the substance of the amendment. Id. at
1570, 1573.
144. 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993).
145. Berning, 990 F.2d at 277; Gray, 989 F.2d at 1570.
146. See TBG Inc. v. Bendis, No. Civ. AL 89-2423-0, 1992 WL 80622 (D. Kan.
Mar. 5, 1992) (limiting its holding to § 27A(a) without addressing § 27A(b)).
Compare Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., No. 89 C 8571, 1992
WL 3694, at *6 (finding § 27A constitutional because it does not direct courts to
make particular factual findings or decisions) and Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards
Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 969-970 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (declaring § 27A constitu-
tionally sound in conclusory terms and devoting one paragraph to discussing
the issue) with Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1478, 1480-84
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (devoting more analysis to determination of the constitution-
ality of § 27A) and Maio v. Advanced Filtration Sys., Ltd., 795 F. Supp. 1364,
1371-76 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same).
147. See, e.g., Lundy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346, 348-50
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (focusing exclusively on separation of powers argument based
on Klein). But cf Adler v. Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1244
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One court, however, has discussed vested rights in relation
to section 27A. InAxel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York promul-
gated an early and quite influential decision regarding the con-
stitutionality of section 27A. 148 In reinstating a securities fraud
claim under section 27A, the Axel Johnson court found no viola-
tion of due process or separation of powers.149 The court stated
that the short time between final adjudication and subsequent
passage of section 27A rendered that judgment less certain and
allowed the principles underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to over-
come the concept of rights vesting in a final judgment.150 All
subsequent decisions in the Southern District of New York,
which has been particularly active in deciding section 27A
claims, 151 have followed Axel Johnson's lead in upholding the
constitutionality of the amendment. 52
B. DECISIONS FINDING SECTION 27A UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although no circuit court has yet found section 27A uncon-
stitutional, numerous district courts have voided the amend-
ment. District courts striking down section 27A have relied on
separation of powers and due process violations.15 Despite the
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (arguing that McCullough "does not apply where the judgment
was not based upon the merits of the claim, but instead was the result of the
application of the defense of statute of limitations, a mere technical rule," but
citing no authority for that proposition).
148. 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
149. Id. at 483. The Axel court stated that § 27A provided "evenhanded
treatment [that] is less threatening to the judiciary's independence than would
be Congressional action to reverse particular adjudications." Id.
150. See id. at 482. This court believed that, in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),
the short duration between the retroactive application of Lampf and enactment
of§ 27A(b) lessened the force of a vested rights claim because the finality of the
decision would be less certain. Id.
151. See, e.g., Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 90 Civ. 5610, 1992 WL 197412
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1992); Barr v. McGraw-Hill, No. 88 Civ. 2498, 1992 WL
196754 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992); Kalmanson v. McLaughlin, No. 86 Civ. 9366,
1992 WL 190139 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1992); Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., 801 F. Supp.
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
152. See, e.g., Barr, 1992 WL 196754, at *6 (agreeing with other Second Cir-
cuit courts "that have found that § 27A... did not usurp normal judicial func-
tions" and citingAxel Johnson); Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. at 1314 (citingAxel
Johnson); Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243, 1245 (same).
153. One court has also held that James Beam, discussed supra note 10, was
a constitutionally based decision that cannot be overturned by legislative fiat.
See Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Rospatch Corp. (In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.), 802 F.
Supp. 110, 115 (W.D. Mich. 1992). But see Ash v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
806 F. Supp. 1473, 1477-78 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (finding Beam ambiguous as to
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Ninth Circuit's subsequent and contrary holding in Gray v. First
Winthrop Corp., 5 the District Court for the Northern District
of California decided one of the most extensive cases expressing
theories in favor of striking down the amendment, In re
Brichard Securities Litigation. 55 In Brichard, the district court
voided the amendment on several grounds, but focused primar-
ily on Klein's separation of powers analysis, 56 concluding that
"section 27A(a) attempts to control one part of the adjudicative
process without making a change in the underlying law" by "di-
rect[ing] interim judgments of a court."' 57 The court further
concluded that its assessment of the constitutionality of part (a)
applied even more forcefully to part (b) because section 27A(b)
further intrudes into the province of the judiciary and vested
rights by directing courts to reinstate previously dismissed
claims.' 58
The now defunct Brichard opinion is not the only example of
judicial disquietude with the amendment, as other district
courts have also relied on Klein to invalidate section 27A.1
59
The Klein rationale, if accepted, renders both parts (a) and (b) of
the amendment unconstitutional. Under that framework both
whether it rests on constitutional or prudential grounds). Given the number of
separate opinions in Beam, see supra note 11, coupled with the subsequent and
potential changes in the makeup of the Court, it is difficult to say that the rule
against selective prospectivity in judicial decision making announced in Beam
will ultimately be viewed as constitutionally based.
154. 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1993).
155. 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
156. See Sabino, supra note 11, at 34-39. The district court relied heavily on
Kein and cited the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robert-
son. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1102 (citing Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson,
914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1407
(1992)).
157. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1105.
158. The court deemed § 27A(b) improper because it risked turning judg-
ments into advisory opinions that are not within the judiciary's power and be-
cause it constituted an act of legislative review. Id. at 1107. While avoiding use
of the term "vested rights," and not citing McCullough, the court did allow that
"Congress does not have the power to upset final judgments of either the
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts." Id.
159. See Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Rospatch Corp. (In re Rospatch Sec. Litig.),
802 F. Supp. 110, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1992) ("Much as Klein was unconstitutional
because it directed the effect courts should give to a pardon, § 27A is unconsti-
tutional because it directs the effect courts should give to a limitations period.");
Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992); Bank of Den-
ver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo.
1992). These Colorado decisions only provide intellectual fodder rather than
binding precedent as the Tenth Circuit found § 27A constitutionally sound in
Anixter. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 13 S. Ct. 1841 (1993).
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subsections amount to an untenable congressional attempt to
control the judiciary's interpretation of the law. Along with
Klein, courts have relied on the McCullough rule in concluding
that section 27A impermissibly dispossesses litigants of vested
rights.160 At least one court has followed this principle in void-
ing 27A(b) while upholding part (a) of the amendment. 161
III. ANATOMY OF AN AMENDMENT: THE TWO
CONSTITUTIONAL FACES OF 27A-DUE PROCESS AND
LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENT
Congress did not enact section 27A until six months after
the Court's decision in Lampf.162 When Congress finally did re-
act, it did not specify a different limitation period than that set
by Lampf but merely denied the retroactive application of that
decision to cases still pending as well as to those that had been
dismissed.16 3 Parts (a) and (b) of the amendment take separate
analytical routes at the point of dismissal: part (a) attempts to
prevent further retroactive application of Lampf, while part (b)
tries to undo the results of the retroactive application of Lampfs
limitation period. Section 27A as a whole attempts to obtain a
consistent result by denying Lampf retroactive application in its
entirety. Its constituent parts, however, achieve this result by
different means, which, when viewed within constitutional and
precedential parameters, have differing degrees of legitimacy.
Assessment of the validity of section 27A(a) requires deter-
mining whether this subsection actually changes the law set
down by Lampf or merely instructs the courts to judge cases in a
manner inconsistent with current law.'6 4 This assessment re-
quires an analysis that relies primarily on the proper function-
ing of the respective branches in light of Klein's rule of decision
analysis and also incorporates the due process concerns impli-
cated by retroactive legislation.
160. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky.
1992); see also Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (up-
holding part (a) while striking down part (b) based on McCullough).
161. See Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1059.
162. Lampf came down on June 20, 1991 and the amendment was signed
into law on December 19, 1991. Contra Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen,
790 F. Supp. 476, 482-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the time between the
decision and passage of the amendment was sufficiently short to prevent
inequity).
163. See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (discussing the legislative history of the amendment). See supra note 14
for the language of the amendment.
164. See supra I.B.3.b (discussing rule of decision analysis).
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In contrast, the issue posed by section 27A(b) requires an
analysis of the extent to which rights that are vested through
the actions of one branch are abrogable by the actions of an-
other. A congressional reversal of judicial decisions implicates
two intertwining constitutional concerns. Retroactive legisla-
tion of this type infringes on a litigant's due process rights in the
finality of judgment.165 Furthermore, legislative infringement
on the judiciary's responsibility to hear and adjudicate cases vio-
lates the doctrine of separation of powers.
166
A. 27A(a): RuLE OF DECISION V. ALTERED PROVISION
The validity of section 27A(a) turns on whether the provi-
sion changes the underlying law in a manner consistent with the
proper exercise of congressional power or whether it merely dic-
tates how courts should properly hear and determine cases.
167
Seattle Audubon dictates that Congress may "modif[y] the
[legal] provisions at issue in" appropriate cases as long as it does
not direct any particular findings by the courts as forbidden by
Klein.168 Thus, determining whether an alteration of Lampfs
limitation period constitutes directing a judicial "finding" or
merely changes an underlying "provision at issue" sheds light
on where section 27A(a) fits within the Klein and Seattle Audu-
bon "rule of decision" analysis.
Despite its ability to alter provisions that affect certain
cases, Congress may not "pass[ ] the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power" by enacting legislation that
directs the rule of decision to be applied in specific cases.
169
Such action would usurp the judiciary's capacity to effectively
state the law.170 The same fears that led the Court to invalidate
the challenged law in Klein are present in both subsections
27A(a) and 27A(b), because the judiciary is being instructed to
ignore a statute of limitation that it had previously deemed ap-
plicable to satisfy a congressional vision regarding the appropri-
ate treatment of litigants.
The statute struck down in Klein attempted to invalidate
165. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the interests im-
plicated by due process).
166. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
finality of judgments).
167. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (explaining Congress's
ability to change an underlying law after a court decision).
168. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 (1992).
169. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
170. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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claims through an evidentiary rule,171 whereas section 27A at-
tempts to sustain claims by preventing the application of a judi-
cially implied limitation period. Although section 27A(a) merely
alters an underlying limitation provision and does not specifi-
cally direct final judgments, it remains theoretically problem-
atic.'7 2 Restraining the congressional desire to interfere with
the judiciary clearly motivates the Klein holding. Disavowing
the principle behind Klein makes it difficult to find any legisla-
tive enactment violative of separation of powers, for the viola-
tion may always be labeled as some sort of a "change" in the
law.
Applying the finding/provision framework of Seattle Audu-
bon, it appears that the cases affected by part (a) of the amend-
ment involve mere alterable "provisions," thereby legitimizing
that portion of the amendment. Returning the courts to the pre-
Lampf state of the law only for cases filed before that decision,
while leaving Lampf intact for any subsequent actions, is likely
to promote confusion and inconsistency. 173 This course of ac-
tion, however, does arguably "change" the law in a manner con-
sistent with Seattle Audubon because the legislature may
readily controvert' 74 such an artificial limitation period.'75 The
amendment merely provides that each pending claim will be de-
cided based on a limitation period different from the one promul-
gated in Lampf. Although section 27A(a) does direct the courts
to apply old law regarding statutes of limitation, the "changed"
limitation period does not "direct any particular findings of
fact" 176 or compel any "findings or results under old law."' 77
The ability of Congress and the courts to determine exactly
which cases will be affected by the altered limitation periods
171. See supra note 105 (explaining the "rule of decision" principle).
172. Klein also dealt with an underlying evidentiary "provision" that left
room for differing end results, see In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098,
1105 (N.D. Cal. 1992), but that failed to save the challenged action because of
the overriding congressional intent to interfere in the judicial province. See
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
173. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 555-56 (discussing inconsistent state of
the law regarding securities fraud limitation periods before the Lampf
decision).
174. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) (allowing
legislatively altered limitation period to stand).
175. See id. at 314 (asserting that limitation periods are based "in necessity
and convenience rather than in logic").
176. Seattle Audubon, 112 S. Ct. at 1413.
177. Id. at 1413; see supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (discussing
rule of decision and Seattle Audubon).
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does not, by itself, invalidate the amendment. 78
By enacting section 27A(a), Congress essentially usurped
the judicial function. The recent willingness of the Seattle Au-
dubon Court to label a new provision an acceptable modification
of the underlying law,179 however, may allow this portion of the
amendment to withstand judicial scrutiny. If the provision is
indeed an acceptable change in the law, then the courts must
apply pre-Lampf law to the cases pending on appeal in accord-
ance with the statute.18 0
The minimal encroachment of 27A(a) into the judicial prov-
ince is made even more palatable when viewed in the general
context of the low-level procedural and substantive due process
scrutiny for retroactive legislation.' 8 ' This portion of the
amendment serves securities fraud plaintiffs' strong equitable
interests 8 2 as it merely provides an opportunity to have their
cases heard. Defendants who may gain a windfall from Lampfs
retroactivity cannot justifiably rely on the unexpected benefit of
an altered limitation period.' 8 3 The low-level due process con-
cerns coupled with the potential evisceration of Klein should be
enough for the judiciary to disregard this legislative encroach-
ment into the judicial province.' 8 4
178. The amendment at issue in Seattle Audubon specifically delineated
which cases would be affected by the Northwest Timber Compromise. See
supra note 14 for the language of the amendment. This did not alter the
Supreme Court's reasoning in that case, for the law "effectively modif[ied] the
provisions at issue." Seattle Audubon, 112 S. Ct. at 1414. But see CoRwmn,
supra note 25, at 73, 93 (discussing punitive intent of such legislation which
would grant Congress an impermissible judicial power).
179. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1413 (1992)
(avoiding rule of decision analysis because the contested legislation did not di-
rect findings of fact or applications of law).
180. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (stating that appellate
courts apply changes in underlying law).
181. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (discussing the due pro-
cess concerns which retroactive legislation may invoke).
182. The amendment merely reinstates a remedy that may have been avail-
able to litigants. See infra note 218 for a discussion of the relative underlying
equities of the litigants prior to Lampf. Seattle Audubon's failure to follow
Klein may have achieved the right result on the specific facts of that case, but
the language of Seattle Audubon could encourage the courts to ignore Klein al-
together. A broader reading of Klein than that given by the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, whereby such legislative action would be untenable, is more appropri-
ate in a practical sense. Such legislative action creates a threat to the legiti-
mate functioning of the courts and individual liberty.
183. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 316 (1945) (declaring
that defendant could not violate the law "depending on a statute of limitation
for shelter from liability").
184. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 697 (discussing how equitable interests
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B. DIsPJ ATE CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND THE PURSUIT
OF EQUITY: THE PEcULLAR IMPLICATIONS OF 27A(b)
Much of the conflict over section 27A stems from confusion
over the amendment's effect'8 5 because courts address either
the amendment as a whole, or whichever part affects the case at
bar.'8 6 Although Klein's rule of decision rationale would inval-
idate section 27A(b) in the same manner as 27A(a), part (b) of
the amendment fails to survive constitutional scrutiny because
it violates multiple constitutional considerations. Section
27A(b) impinges on the structural requirement of separated
powers and compromises heightened due process rights by ig-
noring an institutional respect for final judgments.' 8 7
As a general rule, courts apply retroactive legislation cau-
tiously.' 8 8 Chase Securities Corp., however, made it clear that
defendants do not have a sufficient due process right in an ex-
pired limitation period to prevent the legislature from retroac-
tively altering that defense to allow plaintiffs to bring their
claims.'8 9 Although limitation periods are retroactively adjust-
able, once litigants' rights are settled through adjudication, 90
Congress has no authority to alter those final decisions and de-
are important in determining the validity of retroactive legislation through
three enumerated factors).
185. Compare Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp.
476, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (arguing that § 27A "exhibits the central characteris-
tic of legislation, as opposed to adjudication") with In re Brichard Sec. Litig.,
788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (arguing that § 27A "attempts to con-
trol one part of the adjudicative process without making a change in the under-
lying law").
186. See Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (uphold-
ing part (a) while striking down part (b) of the amendment); see also TBG Inc. v.
Bendis, No. Civ. A. 89-2423-0, 1992 WL 80622, at *6 n.7 (D. Kan. Mar. 5, 1992)
(not addressing § 27A(b)).
187. See, e.g., Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1060; see supra notes 62-69 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of legislative inability to disturb a final
judgment.
One Commentator has also argued that "section 27A does not affect Consti-
tutional Rights" in light of Chase Securities. Sabino, supra note 11, at 52.
Although this may adequately explain § 27A(a) to some, it does not reconcile
27A(b) with McCullough. The simple truth is that they are irreconcilable.
Even Sabino would agree that "Congress may not enact a change in the law
that upsets the results of the final judgments of the courts." Id. at 53.
188. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; see also Smith, supra
note 54, at 415 (arguing that retroactivity itself is an insufficient objection with-
out other constitutional considerations and therefore, "manifestly unsound").
189. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314-16 (1945).
190. See supra note 48 (defining a judgment based on a statute of limitation
as on the merits).
223
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:197
prive litigants of the benefit of a final judgment.19 ' The Chase
Securities Court recognized this important distinction between
mere limitation periods and adjudicated rights in light of due
process concerns.' 92 Although finality of judgment invokes both
the litigants' heightened due process interests in protecting
their adjudicated property rights193 and an overall reliance in-
terest in the stability of judicial decision making, 94 analyzing
the amendment's validity merely in variable levels of due pro-
cess is insufficient.195 Rather, the due process interests invoked
by final adjudication garnish greater relevance when viewed
within the context of separation of powers.
The principle that final adjudicated decisions vest the rights
of litigants in a manner uncontrovertible by the legislature196 is
necessary to properly maintain an independent judiciary 97 and
to protect the due process interests of those appearing before the
courts. An analysis relating retroactivity and the due process
concerns of vested rights to separation of powers must take into
account the impact of allowing an active Congress even greater
leeway in overturning decisions of an institutionally passive ju-
diciary.' 98 Institutional respect for judicial decision making is a
necessary incident of our governmental framework, because
"granting Congress the power to set aside final judgments would
191. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898). See supra note 62
for a discussion of the finality of judgment.
192. See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 316.
193. See supra note 66.
194. See Hochman, supra note 23, at 718 (proposing that passing of right
into judgment increases desire for stability).
195. This analysis does not rely on outdated notions of substantive due pro-
cess. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. This analysis implicates
the procedural elements of due process protection that crystallize in a final
judgment and preclude a legislative divestment from a separate power. See
supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing McCullough and
the finality of judgment).
197. See United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48 (1874).
198. The framers regarded institutional safeguards as necessary to guard
against the inherent tendency of legislative bodies to extend the reach of their
power:
The representatives of the people ... seem sometimes to fancy that
they are the people themselves; and betray strong symptoms of impa-
tience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quar-
ter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary,
were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They
often appear disposed to exert an imperious controul over the other
departments ....
Tim FEDERALIST No. 71, at 483-84 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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transform judicial rulings into advisory opinions."'L99 Structural
disrespect of the judiciary fictionalizes separation of powers by
subordinating the courts to a congressional "court of last re-
sort,"20 0 that, in turn, renders judicial protection of individual
rights a nullity through a superior legislative appeal.20' For
this reason it is imperative that "[w]hen a judgment becomes
final, it is final for all purposes, regardless of its basis." 202
The judicial functions protected by our constitutional struc-
ture and the separation of powers doctrine "spill[ ] over into"203
the realm of due process. Implicating multiple constitutional
concerns heightens the necessity for protection against such leg-
islative encroachment, because these institutional safeguards
are necessarily grounded in the concepts of justice and fairness
to the parties in front of the court.20 4 Section 27A(b) impermis-
sibly blurs the distinction between the legislature and judiciary.
Unlike section 27A(a), this distinction does not necessarily re-
sult from the amendment promulgating a rule of decision for the
courts. 20 5 Rather, section 27A(b) usurps the equitable basis of
the judiciary's functional capacity to grant relief from a final
judgment through a mandatory, congressionally imposed rever-
sal of vested rights.20 6 Congress may indeed have had a rational
basis for enacting section 27A. The rational basis or balancing
199. Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
200. Peony Park, Inc. v. OValley, 121 F. Supp. 690, 694 (D. Neb. 1954),
affd, 223 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 845 (1955).
201. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (discussing the signifi-
cance of finality of judgment).
202. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky. 1992).
203. King v. Finch, 428 F.2d 709, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1970); see Treiber, 796 F.
Supp. at 1059.
204. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 487 ("If life, liberty or prop-
erty is at stake, the individual has a right to a fair procedure.").
205. See supra notes 104-105 (recognizing that Congress may not direct
findings by the judiciary). A direct attack on § 27A(a) requires a greater em-
phasis on the rule of Mein, because the heightened due process and separation
of power concerns invoked by finality of judgment are not yet present. Courts
upholding the constitutionality of § 27A, however, have failed to recognize that
as a result of Lampf and James Beam, the cases § 27A(b) affects are no longer
pending and must be analyzed differently than those cases affected by 27A(a).
See Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1059 (recognizing that the plain language of
§ 27A(b) governs cases not pending before the courts). See supra note 14 for the
language of § 27A(b).
206. The theoretical basis for Klein and Seattle Audubon provides a glimpse
into this distinction. Klein and Seattle Audubon both expressed that there are
limits as to the extent to which Congress may instruct the courts how best to
fulfill their duties under Article III. See supra notes 104-112. McCullough, on
the other hand, removes finally adjudicated decisions from potential legislative
upheaval by vesting the rights of the litigants before the court. See supra note
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test used to determine if general retroactive legislation satisfies
due process constraints is inappropriate in this instance, how-
ever,20 7 because McCullough and its progeny allow no congres-
sional divestment of a judicially determined right.208
Although the Constitution forbids Congress from revisiting
final decisions, the judiciary may, in limited circumstances, 20 9
reconsider a judgment through application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b).210 A motion to reinstate a securities
fraud claim under section 27A(b) is not analogous to the Rule,
however, because 27A(b) misconstrues the equitable function
and philosophy behind reinstatement under Rule 60(b).211 In-
deed, the rationale of Rule 60(b) gives strength to the argument
that section 27A(b) impermissibly impinges on a strictly judicial
function because the Rule is designed to provide litigants with
an opportunity to revisit a judgment when a court independently
determines in its equitable judgment that the facts of any partic-
ular case, including statutory changes, warrant reinstate-
ment.212 Mandatory reinstatement through laws which reflect a
legislative determination that an injustice occurred within the
judiciary undermines the structural considerations implicit in
Rule 60(b) by granting the legislature an impermissible power of
ultimate judicial review.
Congress could not agree on a change in the underlying lim-
itation period announced in Lampf.213 Such an amended limita-
tion period would have given the judiciary an opportunity to
grant equitable relief to litigants facing unfair prejudice from
the effects of a prior dismissal.2 14 Section 27A(b) does not, how-
ever, create any "new rights or remedies" to satisfy the stringent
62 (describing McCullough's rule of finality of judgment and citing other cases
following that rule).
207. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text ("modified" rational ba-
sis test for retroactive legislation).
208. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (McCullough's rule of finality
of judgment).
209. See 7 MooRE ET AL., supra note 79, 60.27[1] (discussing necessity of
exceptional circumstances for Rule 60(b) relief).
210. See supra note 78 (language of Rule 60(b)).
211. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the judici-
ary's equitable power to grant relief from a final judgment).
212. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the judici-
ary's equitable power to grant relief from judgment).
213. See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1105-06 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (discussing legislative history).
214. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing requirements for
granting relief from judgment).
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requirements for reinstating a claim.215 Instead, the amend-
ment instructs courts to reinstate dismissed cases and to pre-
tend that Lampf was never applied retroactively.216
Acquiescence in such behavior could lead to a congressional re-
determination of what is "fair" and "just" for litigants whenever
Congress disagrees with the incidents of judicial decision mak-
ing. This result is untenable because the distinct and separate
power of Congress cannot circumvent the application of exclu-
sively judicial principles by ordering the courts to reinstate adju-
dicated cases.217
The mere fact that unsympathetic defendants benefit from a
judicial decision provides no rationale for ignoring the proce-
dural and structural guarantees of our federal system of govern-
ance. 218 In the same way that the judiciary cannot tell the
legislature what laws to enact, Congress cannot determine what
215. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that new rights or
remedies may avoid effects of prior judgment).
216. See Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104.
217. McCullough simply does not allow this result. See supra note 62; see
also Tonya K. ex rel. Diane K. v. Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir.
1988) (claiming the argument that reopening a case under Rule 60(b) does not
interfere with vested rights requires acceptance of the view that "there are no
'rights' of any kind, and every decision fixing interests in property is forever
malleable"). See supra Part I.D.3 for discussion of separation of powers.
218. See supra notes 62 & 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing vested
rights and relief from judgment).
The equitable parameters of due process may initially seem to support up-
holding part (b) of the amendment as constitutional, for it merely reinstates
claims so as to provide an opportunity to be heard. The Tenth Circuit declared
that "Congress evinced a legitimate purpose to protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of litigants who relied on established law in filing § 10(b) actions."
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1841 (1993). Given the varying approaches taken by the cir-
cuits and the various states they serve, the overall approach to determining
limitation periods can hardly be dismissed as "established" despite its standing
within the confines of the Tenth Circuit. For a delineation of the differing ap-
proaches that jurisdictions took in applying statutes of limitation to 10(b)-5
claims before Lampf, see Stewart, supra note 5, at 556.
The proposition of fairness allegedly implicit within § 27A(b) is itself debat-
able. See Smead, supra note 25, at 777 (arguing the concept of justice is the
basic component of opposition to retroactive legislation); supra note 117
(amendment may promote vexatious litigation). Such a notion loses all authori-
tative force when the equitable concerns of due process are viewed in light of
the structural guarantees of our separated government. Compare Hochman,
supra note 23, at 720-24 (arguing that the rights acquired through statutes of
limitation rest on insubstantial equity) with id. at 718-19 (arguing that the
rights passed into judgment present a stronger claim). Hochman would analyze
§ 27A in terms of a three-factor balancing test, but this does not account for the
requirement of separation of powers. See id. at 697.
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is just and unjust in the realm of finally adjudicated deci-
sions.219 Legislation such as 27A, particularly subsection (b), is
inherently punitive in its retroactive effect 220 and upsets the
precepts that underlie our government. Sustaining the distinct
nature of these roles is necessary for the protection of individual
rights through the proper maintenance of the structural frame-
work of our government.
CONCLUSION
Congress may not enact legislation upsetting adjudicatorily
vested rights in a manner that is inconsistent with equitable
principles and the structural framework of the Constitution. Ju-
dicial complacency regarding legislation such as section 27A(b)
upsets the delicate balance between the respective branches by
relegating the judiciary to the role of mere advisor to Congress
rather than structural coequal. Moreover, the courts have a
duty to protect and enforce the rights of litigants before them.
To ensure a sustained judicial capacity to do so the courts must
avoid abdicating that role to the legislature. Allowing Congress
to divest litigants of rights accrued through adjudication vio-
lates the due process rights of those litigants. Although section
27A(a) is disquieting, it should survive constitutional scrutiny in
light of recent precedent and a willingness within the judiciary
to acquiesce in congressional determinations of, and changes in,
the law despite an intrusion into the judicial province. Section
27A(b), however, imperils the future role of a completely in-
dependent court system by subjecting judicial decisions to a con-
stitutionally untenable review by Congress.
219. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 412 (1792) ("[N]o deci-
sion of any court of the United States can... be liable to a reversion.., by the
Legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be
vested....").
220. See CORWiN, supra note 25, at 93, 98.
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